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Intervention and the ordering of the
modern world
JOHN MACMILLAN*
Abstract. This introductory discussion establishes the notion of intervention as a ‘social practice’
and carves out the contextual and conceptual space for the Special Issue as a whole. The first
move is to recontextualise intervention in terms of ‘modernity’ as distinct from the sovereign
states system. This shift enables a better appreciation of the dynamic and evolutionary context
that generates variation in the practice of intervention over time and space and which is analyti-
cally sensitive to the economic and cultural (as well as Great Power) hierarchies that generate
rationales for intervention. The second move is to reconceptualise intervention as a specific
modality of coercion relatively well-suited to the regulation or mediation of conflict between
territorially bounded political communities and transnational social forces. Third is to ‘histori-
cise’ the practice of intervention through showing how it has changed in relation to a range of
international orders that have defined the modern world and which are each characterised by a
different notion of the relationship between social and territorial space. Fourth and finally is a
brief consideration of the possibility of intervention’s demise as a social practice.
John MacMillan is Senior Lecturer in International Relations at Brunel University.
Introduction
There can be little doubt that intervention has been one of the most high-profile
political topics of the post-Cold War period. Its prominence in foreign policy debates
arises not only from the frequent and controversial incidence of military intervention
in this period but also the expansion in the range of issues or ‘problems’ to which inter-
vention has been directed. States and international organisations have intervened, for
example, to relieve humanitarian suffering, to defend and promote democracy, to
degrade hostile transnational movements, to determine the outcomes of civil wars,
and to build (and transform) the institutions and capacities of ‘fragile’ or ‘failing’
states. That the record of these interventions is at best mixed is widely acknowledged
and in many instances the intervening party’s hopes for a swift and decisive action
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were soon disappointed.1 Yet the topic of intervention has also long been of interest
to students of International Relations (IR) for what it says about the state of sover-
eignty and patterns of power and authority in the international system, and in recent
years there has been a marked rise of interest in the history of intervention too, albeit
with a marked focus on humanitarian intervention.2 In fact, however, the policy, the
conceptual, and the historical dimensions of the subject are more closely connected
than is often realised. Not least, this is because the conceptual and historical analysis
of intervention is able to draw out longer term contextual and political shifts in the
practice of intervention that in subtle but powerful ways shape the possibilities of
policy in the present and how such policies will be interpreted and understood.
Nevertheless, the conceptual and historical study of intervention remains under-
developed and in a move towards redressing this, the Special Issue develops a historical
sociological perspective upon the subject and focuses especially on the place or role
of intervention in the ‘ordering’ and ‘reordering’ of the modern world. Specifically,
the move to resituate the practice of ‘intervention’ in the ontological context of
modernity, as distinct from the more familiar context of the sovereign state system,
highlights its particular capacity for coercively regulating the conflicts that arise
between bounded territorial political communities and transnational social forces.
The centrality of this conflict-prone dynamic between territoriality and transnation-
alism to the development of the modern world in turn helps explain the continued
relevance of intervention as a specific modality of coercion in International Rela-
tions. All of the contributions to this Special Issue speak to this core theme, and the
chronological arrangement of the articles is designed to draw out the historical,
political, and cultural forces that have shaped, and which continue to shape, variation
in the practice of intervention and in regimes of intervention over time and space.
The historical sociological perspective developed in the Special Issue also offers a
fresh stimulus to those mainstream debates upon intervention which frequently find
themselves in a state of impasse. Indeed, debates on intervention have long been
locked into a series of well-trodden dichotomies and dilemmas between, for example,
interests vs. rules (or norms), selectivity vs. consistency, intentions vs. capacity, legiti-
macy vs. legality, and surgical action vs. quagmire. These settled frameworks of
debate, coupled with the impossibility of anything approximating a definitive answer
or ‘solution’ to the puzzles they present, reinforce the point on intervention made by
Hedley Bull and Stanley Hoffman some thirty years ago: that ‘there is a sense in
which nothing new can be said about it’.3 The point is especially telling when one
bears in mind that in the meantime the literature on such cognate practices as ‘war’
1 See, for example, ICISS (International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty), The Respon-
sibility to Protect (Vancouver: University of British Columbia, 2001), p. 1; Roland Paris, At War’s End:
Building Peace after Civil Conflict (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004); Shahar Hameiri,
Regulating Statehood: State Building and the Transformation of the Global Order (Basingstoke: Macmillan,
2010), pp. 20–4.
2 Gary J. Bass, Freedom’s Battle: The Origin of Humanitarian Intervention (New York: Vintage Books,
2008); Michael Barnett, Empire of Humanity: A History of Humanitarianism (Ithaca: Cornell University
Press, 2011); Brendan Simms and David Trim, Humanitarian Intervention: A History (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2011); Davide Rodogno, Against Massacre: Humanitarian Interventions
in The Ottoman Empire 1815–1914 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012).
3 Hedley Bull, ‘Preface’, in Hedley Bull (ed.), Intervention in World Politics (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1984); Stanley Hoffmann, ‘The Problem of Intervention’, in Bull, Intervention in World Politics, p. 7.
See also Stanley Hoffmann, ‘The Politics and Ethics of Military Intervention’, in Hoffmann, World Dis-
orders: Troubled Peace in the Post-Cold War Era (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 1998), pp. 152–76.
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and ‘empire’ has developed to critically re-evaluate and trace their changing social
dynamics and longer term rise and fall.4 Paradoxically, however, whilst both major
inter-state war and formal colonial empire have withered as international practices
intervention would appear at least to be very much alive and as Lawson and Tardelli
note in the conclusion to this Special Issue retains support amongst key elites, yet it is
at the same time the least theorised.5
One factor that does not change much, however, is the difficulty of defining the
term, not least due to the problem of drawing a clear line between intervention and
the regular business of international relations.6 Whilst not wishing to get bogged
down in this question, and whilst acknowledging that the practice of intervention
has changed over time and that any working conceptualisation is likely to remain
fuzzy at the edges, definitions of intervention tend to identify three recurring features
which help to distinguish it from other practices of coercion and reordering in IR.
Hence as a working guide, intervention is here taken to refer to ‘discrete acts’ of ‘co-
ercive interference’ in the ‘domestic affairs’ of other states, and which do not change
the formal juridical status of the intervened party (as would, for example, annexation
or colonisation).7
The notion that intervention constitutes a ‘social practice’ fits well with the his-
torical and conceptual focus of the Special Issue. For Adler and Pouliot, practices
‘are patterned actions that are embedded in particular organized contexts and, as
such, are articulated into specific types of action and are socially developed through
learning and training’.8 Fundamental to the notion of practice is the question of
‘social recognition’ which in the case of intervention emerged in the vocabulary of
diplomats in the early nineteenth century to refer to a set of actions quite different
in significance and ‘function’ than ‘war’. Whilst social practices in any particular
subject area do not necessarily correspond to any fixed notion of a ‘life-cycle’, they
do evolve and change over time, possibly to the point where they are better under-
stood under another head or ‘simply’ wither away. Accordingly, historical analyses
of social practices will uncover ‘the generative relationships that made them possible,
as well as the socio-political processes that allowed their diffusion’ and in so doing
may denaturalise accepted or taken-for-granted patterns of action in the present
age.9 It is in this spirit that the Special Issue proceeds.
The remainder of this introductory discussion carves out the contextual and con-
ceptual space within which a historical sociological analysis of intervention can
emerge. The first of two sections offers a reconceptualisation of intervention as an
ordering practice through which states have coercively mediated the tensions that
4 See, for example, Mary Kaldor, New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era (2nd edn,
Cambridge: Polity, 2006); Herfried Mu¨nkler, The New Wars (Cambridge: Polity, 2005); Alejandro
Cola´s, Empire (Cambridge, 2007); John Darwin, After Tamerlane, The Global History of Empire Since
1405 (London: Penguin, 2007).
5 But for recent work, see Martha Finnemore, The Purpose of Intervention: Changing Beliefs about the
Use of Force (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003); Cynthia Weber, Simulating Sovereignty: Interven-
tion, the State, and Symbolic Exchange (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).
6 See Stanley Hoffmann, ‘The Problem of Intervention’.
7 For a classic legal definition see Lassa Oppenheim, International Law: A Treatise, vol. 1. (London:
Longman, Green, and Co., 1905), pp. 181–2; for a seminal IR discussion see John Vincent, Noninter-
vention and International Order (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1974), pp. 3–16; and for
contemporary thinking see, for example, Shahar Hameiri, Regulating Statehood, p. 38.
8 Emanuel Adler and Vincent Pouliot, ‘International Practices’, International Theory, 3:1 (2011), p. 5.
9 Adler and Pouliot, ‘International Practices’, pp. 6, 24, 29.
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arise between bounded territoriality and transnational social forces in the modern
world. The centring of modernity in this account is helpful also for drawing out the
point that intervention has been a product of three (overlapping) hierarchies that
shape International Relations: the economic and cultural as well as the more familiar
hierarchy of the Great Powers. The second section historicises the practice through
showing how understandings of intervention have varied in accordance with the
development of the modern international system from its early modern heteronomous
form, through to a bifurcated system from the nineteenth to the mid-twentieth century,
and to the universal system of the present, which is itself presently in a period of tran-
sition as reflected (and facilitated) by changes in the practice of intervention. A key
point that emerges from the discussion in this section is that the weight or burden of
expectation that is placed upon intervention in the present age as a means of reorder-
ing in third states is in fact historically unprecedented and as such policymakers may
simply be asking too much of it. The section closes with a brief discussion of what for
many might be a counter-intuitive position: the possibility of intervention’s demise.
The contexts and concept of intervention
The study of intervention within IR has tended to be caught in a double-bind that
has masked the contribution or role of intervention as a specific modality of coercion
in the modern world. The first arises from a tendency to treat intervention as an
exception to the non-intervention rule, thereby drawing scholars away from investi-
gating the nature and wider contribution of intervention as a social practice in its
own right. The privileged position of the ‘non-intervention’ rule arises from its role
in securing the political autonomy associated with the status of state sovereignty as
the foundational political principle of the modern world. Hence, for Vincent, ‘the
function of the principle of non-intervention in international relations [is] one of
protecting the principle of state sovereignty’.10 Yet, the notion that states have histor-
ically enjoyed autonomy within their respective territorial domain is a myth. It is
not only that, as Stephen Krasner and others have shown, states have long accepted
limits on their autonomy across a range of sectors or issue areas including human
and minority rights, sovereign debt and constitutional structures, either through
coercion or consent, and hence sovereign statehood has rarely been synonymous
with political autonomy over affairs within its territorial domain.11 It is also that
historically states developed a discrete set of intervention rights in these areas, which
both established and gave form to the notion that intervention is not solely a
‘behaviour’, or a socially meaningful ‘action’, but a ‘practice’, recognised as such by
states.12 This, accordingly, invites a re-evaluation of the relationship between inter-
vention and non-intervention whilst also raising the question of the function or role
of such intervention rights in International Relations.
The second bind is the analytical state-centrism manifest in the view of the state
as an autonomous entity, existing outside of a wider set of social relations. From
there, typically, the state is represented as a security-centred, interest-maximising
10 Vincent, Nonintervention, p. 14.
11 Stephen D. Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1999).
12 Adler and Pouliot, ‘International Practices’, p. 5.
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actor as in the realist tradition, an order-centred system-maintainer as in the pluralist
strand of the English School, or as a form of free-floating juridical-ethical community
as in the solidarist strand of the English School and the liberal tradition. Whilst
historical sociological analysis has challenged such representations through decentring
and resituating the state in relation to wider sets of social relations, it has not to date
turned its attentions specifically to the topic of intervention. Its insights are, however,
clearly relevant to the study of a practice that has as its rationale the transgression
of the internal realm by external actors. As John Hobson has argued, ‘historical
sociologists in particular have shown that the domestic and international realms
are thoroughly interpenetrated and mutually constituted. Societies and international
societies are not unitary but are ‘‘constituted of multiple overlapping and intersecting
socio-spatial networks of power’’.’13 Accordingly, historical sociological perspectives
that are focused upon the changing political relationship between territorial and
social space over time are well suited to the study of intervention and historically spe-
cific intervention ‘regimes’.
A key move in the present study is ontological, namely to contextualise interven-
tion through the notion of ‘modernity’, or the ‘modern global system’, rather than
the more familiar abstraction of the sovereign-states system (or international society).
For Buzan and Lawson, ‘modernity’ refers to the ‘intertwined configuration of in-
dustrialization, rational state-building, and ideologies of progress’ and to borrow
Giddens’ phrase, ‘is inherently globalizing’.14 What this shift enables is the opening
of analysis to the fact that the international system is co-constituted through the
emergence and expansion of transnational social forces as well as territorially
bounded political communities. The point may be illustrated through Arrighi’s account
of the co-constitutive relationship between capitalism and the states-system.
For Arrighi, the modern state and capitalism emerged and developed in conjunc-
tion with one another, interdependent in so far as capital required the state’s coercive
and regulatory capacities to provide an environment for accumulation and the state
required capital in order to expand its own resource base and power. Yet the rela-
tionship was also one of dynamic tension, for whereas state power was grounded in
a territorialist logic marked by population and size, for capitalists such factors were
secondary as power was grounded in command over scarce resources and hence, far
from being tied to particular territories, sought the exploitation of opportunities
wherever they should arise, generating therein expansive pressures within the system.
But besides the play of material forces the transnational flow of ideas too, particu-
larly over principles of political legitimacy, have proved a powerful transformative
force over time that illustrate not only the dynamic, reflexive character of the modern
world but also, as John Owen shows, the capacity of such ideas to foster conflict
within and between territorially bounded units.15
13 See John M. Hobson, ‘What’s at stake in bringing historical sociology back into international relations?
Transcending ‘‘chronofetishism’’ and ‘‘tempocentrism’’ in international relations’, in Stephen Hobden
and John M. Hobson (eds), Historical Sociology of International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2002), p. 16; quote from Michael Mann, The Sources of Social Power, vol. 1 (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1986), p. 1.
14 Barry Buzan and George Lawson, ‘The Global Transformation: The Nineteenth Century and the
Making of Modern International Relations’, International Studies Quarterly, (2012), p. 2; Anthony
Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity (Cambridge: Polity, 1991), p. 63.
15 See, notably, John M. Owen IV, The Clash of Ideas in World Politics: Transnational Networks, States
and Regime Change, 1510–2010 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010).
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These dynamic and reflexive properties of the modern international system in
turn underpin its evolutionary character. The cyclical track in the development of
the modern world system, as documented by realists and ‘long-cycle’ theorists, is
evident in the rise and fall of a succession of hegemonic Powers over time, each possess-
ing certain advantages over their predecessor.16 The evolutionary track is manifest in
the increasing complexity of modern social life over time, pressing each successive
hegemon to undertake more ambitious reordering of a wider range of issues over a
geographically more extensive area. The sheer scale of this task has effectively out-
stripped the capacity of any single state and as such has pushed states towards the
development of higher levels of multilateralism and institutionalism over an increas-
ing range of issue areas or sectors.17 This trend carries with it implications for the
rationality of violence as a policy instrument of states and as will be developed below,
part of intervention’s history has been the way in which overtly coercive practices may
be superseded by more subtle rational-bureaucratic means of reordering and control.
The key point for now, however, is that the dynamic interplay between territorially
bounded political communities and transnational forces which is fundamental to the
development of the modern world often generates political conflict, and that it is
intervention that is (relatively) well-suited to the coercive regulation of the tensions
between territorially and transnationalism. By contrast, cognate practices such as
‘war’ between the Powers or formal colonial empire increasingly came to stand in
contradiction to the modern world, which in turn hastened their demise. The practice
of war between the Great Powers developed to the point where advancements in
industrialisation led it to become hugely destructive of that complex and growing
web of transnational social interdependencies that are central to modern life. Like-
wise, the practice of formal colonial empire rested upon a standing denial of the
modern sovereign state and the principle of equality of peoples and became untenable
in the face of the agency and resistance of colonised peoples and the normative ambi-
valence and doubts amongst the colonising states. Thus, whereas major war and
formal empire negate the dynamic tension between territoriality and transnationalism
that drives the development of the modern world, intervention rests upon it; its role or
contribution being to (coercively) regulate or arbitrate the crises that it generates.
Intervention’s role in coercively facilitating the settlement of tensions between
territorial and transnational forces is clearly evident in the specific areas within which
states have claimed intervention rights. These include matters of domestic constitutional-
institutional form; fear of the spread of revolution; property rights; the rights of
creditors in the face of sovereign and private debt; the honour and extraterritorial
rights of foreign citizens in relation to local laws; the question of slavery and the
slave trade; the rights of minority communities (initially religious co-believers but
latterly minorities qua minorities); and the protection of populations against geno-
cide or in the face of egregious violation of their human rights. What conjoins these
intervention rights is the will to order this expanding transnational realm of social
16 See Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981);
George Modelski, ‘The Long Cycle of Global Politics and the Nation-State’, Comparative Studies in
Society and History, 20:2 (1978); Richard Rosecrance, ‘Long Cycle Theory and International Rela-
tions’, International Organization, 41:2 (1987).
17 Giovanni Arrighi, The Long Twentieth Century: Money, Power and the Origins of Our Times (London:
Verso, 2010), see especially pp. 371–86; see also Christopher Chase-Dunn, ‘Interstate System and
Capitalist World-Economy: One Logic or Two?’, International Studies Quarterly, 25:1 (1981), pp. 19–
42.
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relations characteristic of modernity, reaching far into the political, cultural, economic,
and ethical realms of an actual and imagined global social space.
The shift to modernity as the appropriate context within which to study interven-
tion also helps distinguish and more fully analyse those hierarchies of power that
have generated logics and rationales for intervention over time. The familiar focus
on the hierarchy of the Great Powers is still important here, but it is one of three
(historically but not necessarily) overlapping hierarchies within the international
system that have each generated their own rationales for intervention and which
continue to provide a valuable analytical context. These comprise the hierarchy of
the Great Powers as an ordering principle of inter-state relations;18 the hierarchy of
production, trade and finance following the expansion of capitalism and industriali-
sation;19 and the hierarchy of culture or civilisation evident for example in notions of
the ‘standard of civilisation’, race, and difference.20 It is within this complex, evolv-
ing system of hierarchies that practices of intervention/non-intervention have played
out.
The English School has offered a particularly rich understanding of how the first
of these hierarchies, that of the Great Powers, has generated practices of interven-
tion.21 For Hedley Bull and Martin Wight, a condition of being a Great Power was
that it could not be intervened against (at least in its internal affairs).22 The Great
Powers within ‘international society’ hold special rights and duties for the mainte-
nance of international order through, for example, the preservation of the balance
of power, the limitation or containment of war, or the management of crises or
enforcement of the rules or norms of international society.23 Others too, such as
David Lake, have reinforced the relationship between hierarchy and order, as evident
in the point that the ‘capacity for coercion’ is ‘necessary to buttress or sustain authority
in the face of incentives to flout rules designed to constrain behaviour’.24
Edward Keene in this Special Issue provides the vital prelude to existing work that
dates the emergence of the contemporary practice of intervention to the post-1815
peace settlement.25 In an account that is of interest for the analyses of longer-term
18 See, for example, Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics (London:
Macmillan, 1977); Martin Wight, Power Politics (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1979); David A. Lake,
‘Escape from the State of Nature: Authority and Hierarchy in World Politics’, International Security,
32:1 (2007), pp. 47–79; Ian Clark, The Hierarchy of States: Reform and Resistance in the International
Order (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989).
19 See, for example, Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modern World System II: Mercantilism and the Consoli-
dation of the World-Economy, 1600–1750 (New York: Academic Press, 1980) and The Modern World
System III. The Second Era of Great Expansion of the Capitalist World-Economy 1730–1840s (New
York: Academic Press, 1989).
20 See Gerrit W. Gong, The Standard of ‘Civilization’ in International Society (Oxford: Clarendon, 1984);
Edward Keene, Beyond the Anarchical Society (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Martti
Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations: The Rise and Fall of International Law 1870–1960
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Antony Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the
Making of International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).
21 For the role of the Great Powers see in particular Keene, Little, and Woodward below.
22 Bull, ‘Introduction’, Intervention in World Politics, p. 1; Wight, Power Politics, p. 193. For Wight, inter-
vention in a Great Power’s external affairs would be at the risk of war. For a more recent influential
English School work on intervention see Nicholas J. Wheeler, Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Interven-
tion in International Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).
23 Bull, Anarchical Society, p. 207.
24 David A. Lake, ‘Escape from the State of Nature: Authority and Hierarchy in World Politics’, Interna-
tional Security, 32:1 (2007), p. 52.
25 See Vincent, Nonintervention and Finnemore, The Purpose of Intervention; but see Bull, ‘Introduction’
to Intervention in World Politics.
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process of change beyond its immediate subject, Keene shows how deep underlying
structural changes within the international political system generated the conditions
for change in language, practice, and doctrine to take hold. Central in this case was
the displacement of the ‘ancient hierarchies of status and precedence’ by the ‘grada-
tion of Powers’ that was clearly discernible by the last quarter of the eighteenth cen-
tury. This changing nature of international hierarchy and the emergence of ‘Great
Powers’ as the leading political actors was a crucial prerequisite for the notion of in-
tervention that is familiar today and which received diplomatic expression following
the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars.
The second is the hierarchical world economy that expanded rapidly during the
nineteenth century in the wake of industrialisation. Whilst balance of power con-
siderations were always present, the leading Powers in the early to mid-nineteenth
century were concerned with the establishment and maintenance of stable political
conditions for the conduct of commerce. In practice this frequently proved invasive,
not least as the various forms of state and proto-state were challenged to demon-
strate their abilities to guarantee such conditions for international commerce and to
establish their ‘modern’ competencies.26 Indeed, with the increasing financial pene-
tration of peripheral economies as the century progressed intervention for the collec-
tion of sovereign debt became more frequent, until that is the demise of intervention
for this purpose in the 1920s and 1930s.27 Nevertheless, as Woodward, Dodge, and
Williams show in this Special Issue the tensions emanating from the hierarchical
world economy continue to be evident in practices of intervention in the present.
The third hierarchy is that of culture, or difference, manifest historically in civili-
sational, racial, and religious terms.28 European attitudes towards cultural difference
hardened during the nineteenth century such that it became mediated through the
notion of a ‘standard of civilisation’. Amongst other things this provided a concep-
tual language through which to regulate membership of the ‘family of nations’ and,
importantly, to ascribe an inferior juridical status to large parts of the non-European
world. This quasi-sovereign or non-sovereign status might feature under a range of
terms including ‘colonies’, ‘protectorates’, or latterly ‘mandated’ or ‘trustee’ territories.29
As sovereign status came in gradations, so too did sovereign rights, not least that to
non-intervention. Thus as authors such as Keene, Koskenniemi, and Anghie have
emphasised, the European centred ‘family of civilised nations’ maintained a domain
of sovereignty coupled with non-intervention amongst themselves and qualified or
non-sovereignty with intervention elsewhere.30
Robbie Shilliam’s argument in this Issue ascribing primacy to the cultural realm
follows from his initial major move to shift the frame of analysis to that of ‘colonial
modernity’ on the grounds that one finds here a global rule of cultural and in par-
ticular racialised difference, as distinct from the ‘provincial drama’ that in practice
26 For a recent discussion, see Buzan and Lawson, The Global Transformation, pp. 8–10; for the longer
term see Wallerstein cited above and Christopher Chase-Dunn and Peter Grimes, ‘World-Systems
Analysis’, Annual Review of Sociology, 21 (1995), pp. 387–417. See also MacMillan and Jones in this
Special Issue.
27 See Finnemore, The Purpose of Intervention, pp. 24–51.
28 See, in particular, the contributions of Reus-Smit and Shilliam in this Special Issue.
29 See Siba Grovogui, Sovereigns, Quasi sovereigns, and Africans: Race and Self-Determination in Inter-
national Law (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996).
30 Keene, Beyond the Anarchical Society; Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations; Anghie, Imperialism,
Sovereignty and the Making of International Law.
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often characterises sociologies of modernity within IR. In this account Shilliam con-
trasts the competing hermeneutics of the European ‘civilising mission’ with those
of ‘Ethiopianism’ through the case of Mussolini’s invasion of Ethiopia in 1935. The
modus operandi of the civilising mission is for Europeans to ‘act upon their remit to
save Ethiopians/Africans from themselves and from degenerate European(s)’ through
developing a range of techniques for the regulation of colonial difference including
the legal bases for intervention and/or war (that is, violence) on African peoples.
From this perspective, the question of whether intervention is different from war or
empire may itself be regarded as part of a ‘provincial drama’, albeit one with global
implications, for from the hermeneutic of Ethiopianism the key question is that of
self-liberation through disassembling the full spectrum of ‘legal, political and cogni-
tive mechanisms of colonial difference’. In light of the resurgence of intervention as a
means for the domestic reordering of the postcolonial world in recent decades it is
especially important not to separate questions of intervention from those of power
and agency within the international system. In this vein, Shilliam’s underlying ques-
tions are perennially important: who ‘saves’, reorders, and speaks for whom?
In drawing this section together two main points emerge. The first is that there is
good reason that intervention has found a distinct niche in the modern international
system for it provides a discrete modality of coercion that suits the needs of powerful
actors in the modern world to mediate the residual, conflict-prone interplay of terri-
toriality and transnationalism, which is itself constitutive of modernity’s dynamic
and expansive nature. The second is that intervention can rightly be understood in
relation to a threefold set of hierarchies in international relations – those of the Great
Powers, the world economy and of culture. How the rationales or logics of inter-
vention generated by these hierarchies have varied over time is drawn out in the
next section of this discussion.
Historicising intervention
Most analyses of intervention within IR situate the practice within a universal sover-
eign state system. Yet this is but one of several forms of modern international order
and, indeed, one that has been evident only for around fifty years or so since the
wave of decolonisation in the 1960s and 1970s. Historicising intervention across a
range of modern international orders from the heteronomous, to the bifurcated and
the universal shows how the practice has changed over time and enables a greater
sensitivity to the indicators of future transformation in the present.
Christian Reus-Smit discusses the form and justification for ‘transgressions of a
political actor’s domain of jurisdiction or authority’ as it applied in the heteronomous
international system of the early modern period. The empirical focus of the discus-
sion is upon Vitoria’s analytical navigation of the various authority claims of the
Pope and the Holy Roman Emperor in relation to the Indians of South America,
which rested upon the European delimitation of Indian claims over the ‘social space’
of the lands that they owned. That this disarticulation of ‘space’ and ‘place’ has
re-emerged as a major theme in the globalisation literature is well-known, but as
discussed below it is increasingly a feature of interventions in the present age, partic-
ularly those associated with statebuilding and development.
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Whilst the nineteenth century is usually associated with the consolidation of modern
intervention and non-intervention norms, the bifurcated nature of international order
in this period was marked by a formal distinction between the European and non-
European worlds. Within the European core intervention did indeed become the
‘exception’ to the non-intervention norm rooted in mutual recognition between
sovereign equals. Yet in relations between European and non-European political
communities the relationship was one of hierarchy and intervention, with interven-
tion itself being part of a wider family of imperial practices concerned to reorder the
peripheral zones of the expanding global system.
As Richard Little shows in his article in this Special Issue, the establishment of the
non-intervention rule in the early nineteenth century had much to do with the liberal
defence of the principle of self-determination by both Britain and the United States,
with the latter’s interest triggered by its concern to avoid European interference in the
recently independent South American states. Whilst Britain and the dynastic Powers of
Europe shared the wish to avoid destabilising the territorial settlement established at
Vienna in 1815 following the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, the constitutional
Powers could not support the Russian proposal for a collective right of intervention
in order to guarantee dynastic rule.31 The social nature of intervention practice as a
rule-bound phenomenon is evident in the contrast Little draws between the relevance
of the non-intervention rule to the American Civil War in which key actors shared
a broadly common frame of normative reference and the malaise that beset British
policy operating in these terms when faced with the radically different political-
ideological forces contesting the Spanish Civil War.
At the fringes of Europe practices of intervention had long been undertaken to
prevent, halt, or punish massacres or atrocities of co-religionists, particularly in rela-
tion to the Ottoman Empire.32 Beyond Europe, in relation to that group of states
that were themselves sovereign and members of the (European defined) ‘family of
civilised nations’, intervention tended to be geared towards the recognition of Euro-
pean primacy and where necessary the forcible expansion of the world economy
albeit often through influencing the choice of elites and type of order that would
emerge from local contests of power.33 In relation to those communities that were
both non-European and outside the family of civilised nations, and thereby not
regarded as subjects of contemporary international law, the category of intervention
was less relevant insofar as control was exercised through a more permissive, exten-
sive, and discretionary series of practices ranging from formal colonisation through
to mandates and trusteeships.34 One reason why this is particularly significant for
the present age is that these more intrusive and longer-term practices were able to
take up the ‘heavy lifting’ of imperial reordering that was beyond the scope of a
discrete intervention.
Gallagher and Robinson’s argument that formal and informal empire in the nine-
teenth century were essentially interconnected and often interchangeable helps to
elucidate the point. Imperialism was informal where possible and formal where
31 See Castlereagh’s ‘Memorandum on the Treaties of 1814 and 1815, Aix-la-Chapelle, October 1818’ and
‘The State Paper of 5 May 1820; or the Foundations of British Foreign Policy’, in H.W.V Temperley
and L. M. Penson, Foundations of British Foreign Policy, 1792–1902 (London: Frank Cass, 1966),
pp. 34–63.
32 See Rodogno, Against Massacre; also Bass, Freedom’s Battle; Simms & Trim, Humanitarian Intervention.
33 See MacMillan, Jones, Woodward, and Dodge in this Special Issue.
34 See Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations, pp. 98–178; also Shilliam in this Special Issue.
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necessary (circumstances permitting). Intervention as a discrete act belonged primarily
within the informal strand of empire and tended to be used to enhance political
security in a prospective market area, serving as part of the coercive socialisation of
a local elite who would in turn oversee the development of political structures that
would diminish the requirement for further intervention.35 However, should inter-
vention fail, the imperial Power may well resort to more extensive measures as
when Britain, faced with a lack of sustained Chinese cooperation following the
First Opium War, returned to impose more formal structures of regulation over key
Chinese ports. Likewise, Britain’s formal annexation of Lagos in 1861 followed the
failure of three earlier interventions to prevent African Christians being enslaved
and despatched across the Atlantic.36
The work of positivist international lawyers from the late nineteenth century is
valuable as an indication of the way the practice of intervention was understood in
this formally bifurcated order. Firstly, it was distinct from ‘war’. Writing the history
of intervention in 1922 Winfield stressed the point that within Europe intervention
emerged as a category of practice distinct from ‘war’, and that it was associated
with a bounded set of ‘rights’. Whereas ‘the causes of war are practically infinite
and beyond the scope of international law’:
the causes which confer upon one state the right of intervening in another are regarded as
clearly definable by nearly every modern jurist, though little agreement exists as to what
precisely those causes are. Yet they are regarded as comparatively few in number, certainly
not identical with the causes of war.37
That the non-intervention ground rule was not absolute is also evident in Oppenheim’s
influential account:
Intervention is dictatorial interference by a State in the affairs of another State for the purpose
of maintaining or altering the actual condition of things . . . That intervention is, as a rule,
forbidden by International Law, which protects the international personality of the States,
there is no doubt. On the other hand, there is just as little doubt that this rule has exceptions,
for there are interventions which take place by right, and there are others which, although they
do not take place by right, are nevertheless permitted by the Law of Nations.38
Those interventions that ‘do not take place’ by right but are permitted by interna-
tional law tend to arise from the role played by the Great Powers in the maintenance
of international order: either in self-defence or for the maintenance of the balance
of power. Self-defence aside, however, such permissions withered with the formal
institutional and legal development of international society marked by the shift of
authority for international security and system-maintenance to more centralised,
multilateral forums with the creation of the League of Nations and particularly the
United Nations after 1945.
35 John Gallagher and Ronald Robinson, ‘The Imperialism of Free Trade’, The Economic History Review,
6:1 (1953), pp. 6–7.
36 Philip D. Curtin, The Image of Africa: British Ideas and Action, 1780–1850 (London: Macmillan, 1965),
pp. 314–15. For a recent discussion of humanitarian intervention in Africa, see Bronwen Everill and
Josiah Kaplan (eds), The History and Practice of Humanitarian Intervention and Aid in Africa (Basing-
stoke: Macmillan, 2013).
37 P. H. Winfield, ‘The History of Intervention in International Law’, British Yearbook of International
Law (1922–3), p. 131.
38 Oppenheim, International Law, pp. 181–2.
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Secondly, the categories through which the areas or types of intervention are
identified in Winfield’s work and the reach in international law of intervention rights
in Oppenheim’s discussion illustrates the gradations within the intervention regime
that correspond to the imperial character of the international system in this period.
‘External’ intervention was undertaken when, for example, a state held a protectorate
over another state or to settle a dispute between states in treaty rights over a third
state.39 ‘Internal’ intervention, ‘the first and by far the most frequent of these [areas]
is that of interference by one state between disputant sections of the community in
another state, the matter of dispute being usually . . . some constitutional change’40
and referred to the intra-European practice of intervention as discussed above. But
the third type, ‘punitive’ intervention,41 is clearly directed towards imperial reorder-
ing. The examples Winfield offers shows such actions to be associated with the
tensions arising from the economic, social, and cultural expansion of the modern
world whilst also clearly shaped by the hierarchies of the Powers and of civilisation.
He cites European ‘interventions’ against the Argentine confederation, Mexico,
Greece, Portugal, and Korea. Korea aside, these states all enjoyed recognition as
sovereign members of the ‘family of nations’, which in turn entailed recognition of
their ‘equality, dignity, independence, and territorial and personal supremacy’. At
the same time, however, violations of the ‘Personality’ of states during time of peace
‘are excused as are committed in self-preservation or through justified intervention’.42
Such intervention ‘rights’ provided the legal language and infrastructure for the
expansion and consolidation of the hierarchical and Eurocentric global system into
other (at least nominally) sovereign domains in the face of the rapid expansion of
global social relations in the nineteenth century. Rights served not only to protect
property and investment but to codify the cultural predominance of Europeans
within the emerging global system through, for example, the right to intervene
for the protection of the ‘honour’ of European citizens and the principle of extra-
territoriality.43 At the same time, those actors such as the Latin American states
that were juridically sovereign but economically peripheral in the hierarchy of pro-
duction and finance did seem to find some limited protection against intervention
under international law, if only in the breach. Thus, in the early twentieth century,
the Argentine Foreign Minister Luis Drago argued that the use of force by creditors
to collect sovereign debts ‘put the weak at the mercy of the strong and made states
like those in Latin America no better than colonies’.44 In Africa and Asia, however,
39 Winfield, ‘The History of Intervention’, p. 146.
40 Winfield dates usage of ‘intervention’ as a ‘technical’ phrase to the period circa 1817–30, ‘A History of
Intervention’, p. 134.
41 Winfield, ‘The History of Intervention in International Law’, p. 139; see also Finnemore, ibid., p. 10.
42 Oppenheim, International Law, vol. 1, pp. 154–7, 160, 161.
43 Indeed, well after the demise of a right of intervention to collect contract debts one finds in the eighth
edition of Oppenheim’s International Law (1955, edited by Lauterpacht) the claim that ‘the right of
protection over citizens abroad, which a State holds, may cause an intervention by right to which the
other party is legally bound to submit. And it matters not whether protection of life, security, honour,
or property of a citizen abroad is concerned.’ See Oppenheim, International Law, eighth edition, p. 309.
By the ninth edition, however, intervention by a state to protect the property of its citizens was no
longer regarded as lawful, which was now restricted to the immediate danger of loss of life or injury
in situations in which the local territorial authorities were unable to protect those at risk. See Lassa
Oppenheim, International Law, ninth edition, edited by R. Jennings and A. Watts (London: Longman,
Green & Co., 1993) pp. 441–2.
44 See Finnemore, The Purpose of Intervention, p. 31.
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beyond this intermediate zone, membership of the ‘family of nations’ and the rights
that went with it were tightly restricted and if granted at all then selectively so, such
that their discretionary treatment by Europeans was rationalised, ‘especially with regard
to war’.45
Following decolonisation, the political architecture of the international system
changed once again, to a universal system insofar as it was grounded in the universal
principle of state sovereignty46 and which in turn brought with it fresh implications
for the practice of intervention. During the Cold War, the cultural rationale for inter-
vention diminished in the sense that the superpowers chose not to interfere in the
domestic political affairs of their respective allies on, for example, civilisational or
humanitarian grounds. Instead, however, whilst the geographical scope of interven-
tions were delimited by the existence of tacit spheres of influence, both the ‘United
States and the Soviet Union were driven to intervene in the Third World by the
ideologies inherent in their politics’, with each regarding themselves as representing
the vanguard of modernity.47
Lee Jones in this Special Issue analyses practices of intervention as manifest in the
consolidation of the postcolonial state in Cold War Southeast Asia and shows how
specific sovereignty and intervention regimes drove projects of ordering and reorder-
ing both within states and across regions. Both sovereignty/non-intervention and
intervention were deployed by state elites to control the participants and scope of
political contests which in the case of Southeast Asia was the entrenchment and
defence of a capitalist social order against a range of transnational ethnic and ideo-
logical forces. In revolutionary times in particular, in which the tide of transnational
forces runs high, a key aim of intervention may in fact be domestic political stability
rather than transformation elsewhere. Indeed, as Jones shows this counter-revolu-
tionary aspect of intervention is of longstanding, reaching back for example to the
practice of the Holy Alliance in the early nineteenth century and into the present
with Saudi intervention in Bahrain during the ‘Arab Spring’.
Yet the resurgence of military intervention since the end of the Cold War directed
to reordering the global South has served to expose the limits of the practice in the
present age and can be illustrated through a comparison with the practice of inter-
vention in the bifurcated system of the nineteenth century. As noted above, when
intervention in the nineteenth century proved inadequate or insufficient to achieve
the intervener’s aims, the imperial Powers had at their disposal a wider and more
intensive set of coercive reordering practices including formal colonisation. In this
regard, ‘intervention’ when situated on a spectrum of imperial practices, could even
in the heyday of empire arguably be regarded as ‘empire lite’.48 Yet, as is widely
acknowledged, interveners in the present age have very little by way of such extra
directly coercive imperial capacity. The upshot of this is that in the absence of such
extra imperial measures the weight of expectation upon ‘intervention’ as a reordering
mechanism is historically unprecedented. It was of limited utility even during the
nineteenth-century ‘age of empire’; little wonder it struggles today.
45 Oppenheim, International Law, first edition, pp. 148–57.
46 See Hedley Bull and Adam Watson (eds), The Expansion of International Society (Oxford: Clarendon,
1984).
47 Odd Arne Westad, The Global Cold War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), p. 4.
48 Michael Ignatieff, Empire Lite: Nation-Building in Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan (London: Vintage,
2003).
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One manifestation of this is the difficulty interveners face in establishing an effec-
tive and appropriate mechanism through which to translate whatever military success
they might have into political objectives. During the nineteenth century, as discussed
by MacMillan later in the Special Issue, successful interventions were able to shape
the will of key elite groups within the intervened or target state. Whilst rational cost-
benefit calculations on the part of elites in the intervened state could well establish
some working utility for intervention, the practice was most effective when the elites,
as in the South American cases, shared at some level the wider values, affiliations or
aspirations of the intervening party. When this was not the case, as in Qing dynasty
China, or indeed when states lacked the capacity to institute change as in Brazil for
much of the period of Britain’s slave trade abolition campaign, intervention proved a
much less effective instrument of policy. In the present age and for reasons including
the primacy of local politics and the power of local agency; the limited ‘soft power’
appeal of the intervening states and their limited willingness to maintain an indefinite
presence; and the rise of cultural, economic, and political pluralism at the global level
as the old hierarchies of Power are in flux, the mechanisms through which military
success translates into political objectives are no longer obvious.
Of the post-Cold War period, Susan Woodward discusses the seminal case of the
Balkan interventions of the 1990s and Toby Dodge those of Iraq and Afghanistan.
Woodward historicises the specific experience of the 1990s in terms of the pull arising
from disorder and the solicitations of local actors on the ‘turbulent frontier’ that
marks the fringes of empire, historic, or otherwise. Yet for all the appearance of
being a novel problem, the response of the Great Powers in the 1990s was markedly
similar to that of the Powers in earlier periods of turbulence in this region and was
underpinned by the fact that the Balkans have been a region of limited strategic
significance. But in a telling account, whilst the intervening Powers may have been
unenthusiastic about becoming involved in the crises, a major factor in the emergence
of these crises has been the underlying socioeconomic relationship between local
actors and the regional Powers. Thus, a recurring feature of these crises is that it
has been the economic relations established between the Powers and the Balkan
states that ‘best explain the causes of the disorder and turbulence that they intervened
to staunch’. This argument, that the disjunctures of modernity foster crises that lead
to intervention, the effects of which are often to sow the seeds of the next inter-
vention, adds an important sense of historical perspective to debates upon what
intervention can and cannot achieve.
In the cases of Iraq and Afghanistan, Dodge highlights the point that despite
their initial preferences for a swift intervention and exit, the intervening Powers
were unavoidably drawn into much more extensive and expensive (liberal) peace-
building and statebuilding missions. The tensions and contradictions within these
projects have, however, led to resources being concentrated into the coercive capacities
of what have become despotic states unable to sustain with credibility even the ‘low-
intensity democracy’ favoured by neoliberal elites49 and which comprised an impor-
tant element in the public justification of military action. The pervasiveness of the
liberal statebuilding model and the specific ways in which it is designed to reorder
49 See Barry Gills, Joel Rocamora, and Richard Wilson (eds), Low Intensity Democracy (London: Pluto
Press, 1993); William I. Robinson, Promoting Polyarchy: Globalization, US Intervention and Hegemony
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
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the social space of states is however, theoretically interesting for what it might suggest
about a further shift in the configuration of political authority in the international
system – the changing terms of sovereignty and associated rights and capacities –
and the development of a nascent new model of international order in the form of
governance.
This is most obvious in the field of development and statebuilding interventions
but is also evident more widely and in keeping with Arrighi’s notion above of an evo-
lutionary modern world system. Hameiri draws out the transformative nature of
statebuilding interventions evident in the transnationalisation of certain, selective
institutions of the state through the routinised involvement of international agencies
and non-governmental organisations such as to achieve certain outcomes, whilst leav-
ing the territorial integrity and formal sovereignty of such actors intact.50 Mark
Duffield situates this development in terms of a ‘biopolitical turn’ in intervention
practice since the end of the Cold War such that whilst respect for the territorial
integrity of states remains, ‘sovereignty over life within ineffective states has become
internationalized, negotiable and contingent’.51
Whilst these may be regarded as novel forms of intervention, arguably they are
better understood as a cognate practice due both to their origins and for the fact
that they mark a subtle shift in the wider sovereignty regime. The roots of such
changing practice in ‘development’ thinking is significant here for the way in which,
as David Williams shows in this Issue, ‘development’ emerged ‘as an alternative to
both colonialism and formal intervention’ at a time when the legitimacy of colonial
rule was in decline. Williams teases out both the overlaps and differences between
intervention and contemporary development practice and shows how each has
become increasingly enmeshed in practices of ‘governance’.52 The notion of governance
valuably highlights the disarticulation of social space from territory and its rearticula-
tion within multilevel transnational networks of power and authority such as to
transform the state, whilst maintaining the formal sovereignty of the state and its
elites. For Hameiri, such governance is clearly hierarchical and is indicative of an
increasingly authoritarian liberal global order,53 but its selective, function-specific
nature and the range of different actors involved cannot also but invoke comparison
with the model of heteronomy which characterised the early modern international
order and with which this section began. Whilst a conservative interpretation might
argue that ‘intervention’ stands to ‘governance’ in the present as ‘informal’ stood to
‘formal’ empire in the nineteenth century, a more ambitious interpretation would see
in this trend a greater fundamental development as the sovereignty principle is super-
seded by more complex models of transnational political authority and organisation.
Whilst this is most obvious in the weaker states of the world, it is in fact not confined
to them as all states become increasingly enmeshed in thick networks of international
organisation in interdependence and as such the trend should not be regarded simply
as the re-emergence of a bifurcated international system.54
50 Hameiri, Regulating Statehood.
51 Mark Duffield, Development, Security and Unending War: Governing the World of Peoples (Cambridge:
Polity, 2007) p. 28, emphasis added.
52 See Graham Harrison, The World Bank and Africa: The Construction of Governance States (London:
Routledge, 2004).
53 See Hameiri, Regulating Statehood, p. 6.
54 John Agnew, Globalization and Sovereignty (Lanham: Rowman and Little, 2009).
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The discussion in this section has traced changes in the practice of intervention
in accordance with wider changes in the structure or political architecture of the
international system evident in changes in the system’s ordering principle from heter-
onomy, bifurcation, universality, and arguably in the present age, governance. Spe-
cifically, the discussion has sought to point out how the association of certain bun-
dles of rights with territorial space has changed over time and varied across space in
relation to the three hierarchies of the Powers, the world economy, and culture iden-
tified in the first section. That the study of intervention has long been in the shadow
of non-intervention has served to mask a fundamental difference between the two,
which is that whilst non-intervention has been the norm within the core of the mod-
ern international system, intervention has long been permissive in relations between
core and periphery. Since the end of the Cold War, the practice has been undertaken
by a sufficiently unified core which has frequently demonstrated its will to use force
to reorder the periphery, whether in the fight against militant Islam, the transforma-
tion of fragile states, or in the name of populations that are suffering at the hands of
repressive postcolonial states and/or as a consequence of the destabilising effects of
globalisation. In this vein, to understand intervention in the modern world is to
reckon with the dual frames of the modernity of Marx and Weber on the one hand
and of colonial modernity on the other.
But if intervention is a historically contingent social practice, a discussion of the
topic would not be complete without considering the question of whether the practice
might itself go the way of major industrial war or of formal colonisation. As Keene
traces the conditions that generated the modern doctrine of intervention within
Europe and Williams engages the changes in sovereignty and intervention practice
in the present age, perhaps it is possible to imagine the paths through which interven-
tion too might wither as a social practice? At the most abstract level, however, some
notion of intervention is bound to exist, for as Reus-Smit argues later in this Issue if
intervention is understood as the transgression of historically specific lines of differ-
entiation then it has a place in any social system. But, if one takes a narrower focus
upon military intervention, specifically, then there are a number of factors that could
suggest the path-dependencies through which intervention might wither as a social
practice for the ordering and reordering of the modern world. Three inter-related
dynamics stand out, namely the rise of rational-legal systems of authority and gover-
nance, the diminishing utility of force in the face of increasingly complex political
problems, and the wider political implications of non-violent civil-resistance (as dis-
tinct from civil war) as a means of resisting authoritarian rule.
A significant factor in the demise of intervention for certain purposes historically
has been the rise of rational-bureaucratic forms of power which are more appropriate
for the complex tasks and collaborative nature of much international ordering activity,
as understood in terms of Arrighi’s account of the long-term evolutionary nature of
the modern world system. Finnemore’s analysis of the decline of intervention for
purposes of collecting sovereign debt in the early twentieth century ascribes this to
the rising influence of international lawyers in providing the discursive space for the
contestation and delegitimation of intervention for this purpose.55 In other areas,
whilst it is difficult to measure specific impact, it is quite plausible that the thickening
web of human rights law and the convergence of values over time by certain sets of
55 Finnemore, The Purpose of Intervention, pp. 24–51.
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states may well have lessened the extent of humans rights violations in certain areas
and therein obviated the need for intervention on their behalf.56 By the same token,
as Williams points out below, ‘it is no coincidence that most cases of military inter-
vention certainly in the post-Cold War era have been in those countries where develop-
ment agencies have not had a substantial presence’.
A second factor is the limited utility and appropriateness of military force in con-
temporary interventions and the strategic difficulties of coordinating the military and
political aspects of such operations. That this is an argument made by both military
and humanitarian professionals makes it clear that the practice of intervention is
under stress.57 Whilst one response to this may be simply to adopt other forms of
militarised action such as the use of ‘drones’, special forces, or increased support
for local proxies, such tensions have also played out in efforts to develop the non-
military aspects of intervention. In this regard, part of the rationale behind the Respon-
sibility to Protect Report (2001) was to shift the balance between the military and
non-military dimensions of intervention through an emphasis upon prevention and,
through post-conflict stabilisation, the avoidance of a recurrence of mass human rights
violations. The report may be regarded as firmly within an evolving liberal episteme on
intervention and in this regard read in conjunction with the wider literature on liberal
peacebuilding.58 Yet the paradox is that as this liberal episteme provides a fuller under-
standing of the conditions and causes of conflict and in turn aims to tackle these
problems at their root, the utility of force in the equation tends to diminish.
Accordingly, a more wholesale and radical approach to the demilitarisation of
intervention would be a valuable first step in addressing the complexities and am-
bivalences of intervention in the present age. The danger of an external militarised
response to civil conflict, for example, is that it fuels escalating syndromes of violence
and intensifies and polarises the underlying political issues in contention. The alter-
native rests upon the conceptual affinity between non-violent political and diplomatic
pressure and domestic practices of non-violent civil resistance. Non-violence presents
a philosophical and political alternative to civil war and empirically non-violent
resistance has in the last seventy years or so demonstrated its significance, initially
as a means through which to resist colonial rule and foreign occupation and sub-
sequently in the cause of civil rights and regime change in a diverse range of states.59
56 See Didem Buhari-Gulmez, ‘Stanford School on Sociological Institutionalism: A Global Cultural
Approach’, International Political Sociology, 4 (2010), pp. 253–70; Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn
Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University
Press, 1998).
57 See Rupert Smith, The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World (Penguin: London, 2005);
David Rieff, A Bed for the Night: Humanitarianism in Crisis (London: Vintage, 2002); Barnett, Empire
of Humanity.
58 ICISS (International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty), The Responsibility to Protect
(Vancouver: University of British Columbia, 2001); see, for example, David Chandler, International
Statebuilding: The Rise of Post-Liberal Governance (Abingdon: Routledge, 2010); Edward Newman,
Roland Paris, and Oliver P. Richmond (eds), New Perspectives on Liberal Peacebuilding (Tokyo: United
Nations Press, 2009); Oliver P. Richmond, The Transformation of Peace (Houndsmills, Basingstoke:
Palgrave MacMillan, 2007).
59 See Toshiki Mogami, ‘The United Nations and Non-Violence’, in Yoshikazu Sakamoto (ed.), Global
Transformation: Challenges to the State System (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 1994);
Adam Roberts and Timothy Garton Ash (eds), Civil Resistance and Power Politics: The Experience
of Non-Violent Action from Gandhi to the Present (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011); Erica
Chenoweth and Maria J. Stephan, Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent
Conflict (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011).
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Of course, civil resistance does not come with guarantees, but then neither does armed
rebellion, civil war, or of course intervention.
In any case, the question of whether it is possible to credibly imagine the demise
of military intervention is not simply of academic interest. For whatever humanitarian
or progressive political ends military intervention might be intended to serve, it re-
mains an exercise in lethal violence that can never be entirely discriminate. In what
is likely to be a more pluralist but still highly interdependent age, a shift of emphasis
from the ‘ends’ to the ‘means’ of intervention may make the greater contribution to
bringing into being a world that is both more tolerant and civilised.
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